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. Robinson LADB news analyst The warning issued by deposed Haitian President Jean- Bertrand
Aristide from his hotel suite in the Caracas Hilton several weeks ago, that "what is happening
in Haiti could take place tomorrow anywhere else in Latin America" (NotiSur 01/08/92), proved
prophetic. The abortive February 4 military putsch against the government of Carlos Andres Perez
generated shock waves throughout the hemisphere, from Buenos Aires to Washington, and sent
bewildered policymakers scurrying to diagnose why "South America's most stable democracy" is
tottering on the brink. There are major differences between the Haitian and Venezuelan situations.
Although the succesful coup in Haiti and the aborted one in Venezuela came back-to-back, events
in Port-au-Prince and Caracas do not necessarily signal that the pendulum is again swinging
towards military takeovers throughout the hemisphere. However, taken together, the two sets of
events underscore lessons of paramount importance for Latin America in the 1990s. "Low intensity
democracy" The gains made in restoring representative democracy during the 1980s were widely
applauded in and outside of Latin America. However, a key question was whether the new liberal
democracies would be able to bring about fundamental social reform and economic democratization
demanded by large majorities who had fought the dictatorships of the 1970s. The more skeptical
argued that behind the "democratic miracle" was a basic contradiction: restoration of political
democracy alongside continuity of entrenched systems of social injustice and economic inequalities.
Skeptics' claims were borne out during the 1980s. Socio-economic inequalities have not only
remained pronounced but were exacerbated in almost every Latin American country. During the
"lost decade," GDP per capita in Latin America declined by 9.6%, and in 1990, by 2.6%. Meanwhile,
larger proportions of the population fell into absolute poverty, and the gap between rich and poor
increased. According to a recent report by the UN Economic Commission on Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC), 44% of Latin Americans were below the poverty line by the late 1980s,
compared to an average 32% in the 1970s. In many countries including Mexico, Colombia, Brazil
and Venezuela per capita income actually increased, described as "an indication of the role of
unequal income distribution in the spread of poverty." The deepening of poverty and inequality
is tied to a further deterioration of Latin America's standing in the world economy, characterized
by the debt crisis, deterioration of terms of trade, greater difficulties in market access (witness
the GATT negotiations) and US domination (e.g., Brazil's problems in protecting the domestic
computer industry from domination by US computer giants). Latin America was a net exporter of
capital in the 1980s, 1990 and 1991, despite improvements in most nations' trade balances. Increased
income and wealth inequality also reflect the lack of progress in participatory democracy. Formal
representative democracy has not provided the majority of citizens in Latin American nations with
the means to influence the new civilian regimes' conduct and policy. Popular majorities, despite the
"democratic miracle" of the 1980s, remain locked out of the decision-making and policy processes.
Described above are the contours of what skeptics call "low-intensity democracy," or the restoration
of formal representative democracy and constitutional legitimacy, alongside suppression of a
broader agenda of social justice, economic equality, or mass, participatory democracy. Promoting
"democracy" and "free markets" The "transition to democracy" has coincided with neo- liberal
economic stabilization and restructuring programs in virtually every Latin American country.
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The neo-liberal model pushed by the US and the multilateral financial institutions Washington
effectively controls (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) goes hand in hand with
"low intensity democracy." New Right "technocrats" and the IMF have drawn up far- reaching
austerity and structural adjustment programs, which are then implemented by elite civilian
regimes. From Argentina to Peru, from Brazil to Honduras, the neo-liberal adjustment packages
have been social time bombs, sparking national strikes, "food riots," and others forms of often-
spontaneous protest and repression. Advocates of neo-liberal restructuring argue that the processes
underway are restoring conditions for "efficient" productive enterprise, read realigning parameters
for capitalist accumulation. The adjustment process brings contraction of global demand, and a
transfer of income and resources from workers and small-scale producers to large producers and
foreign capital. Consequently, efforts to achieve more equitable distribution of political power via
democratization collide with the stepped-up concentration of economic power. As recent events
in Venezuela demonstrate, the greatest threat to the "new democracies" is precisely their inability
to respond to deteriorating living conditions and the dwindling of hope for the present and future
affecting between 40% to 80% of respective populations. Waiting for the next "Caracazo" Venezuela
was one of the few Latin American countries to escape the military takeovers of the 1960s and 1970s,
thanks, in large part, to its oil wealth. The oil boom began in 1973, but by 1977 crude prices began to
drop, throwing the Venezuelan economy into stagnation and exposing structural crisis. Venezuelan
economists began to refer to a "new dependency" of an "underdeveloped oil economy" with little
capacity to productively absorb oil export income. Between 1977 and 1982, the IMF and foreign
commercial banks stepped in to forestall crisis through massive lending. Venezuela accumulated
over US$30 billion in foreign debt. Crude prices continued to decline throughout most of the 1980s.
The government of Jaime Lusinchi introduced the first austerity program in 1984, in an attempt
to pay debt service and external financial commitments at the expense of domestic employment
and socio-economic welfare. Between 1984 and 1987, 50% of Venezuela's oil export revenue was
absorbed by debt service, and in 1988, the proportion increased to 70%. In other words, oil income
was financing the foreign debt, not domestic growth and social welfare programs. The economic
crisis has had profound effects on the country's social structure. In 1987, the middle class accounted
for 25% of Venezuelan households, compared to less than 18% today. Over 40% of the population
lives in a state of "destitution," and another 40% lives in poverty. Per capita income has plummeted
to 1950s levels and daily caloric intake has dropped by 25%. [Latinamerica Press (Lima, Peru),
12/12/91.] The endemic corruption and continual scandals that plague all the "new democracies"
have become particularly acute in Venezuela. Perez criticized the IMF during his 1988 electoral
campaign, yet two weeks after taking office on Feb. 2, 1989, he signed a stand-by agreement with
the Fund and implemented a package of drastic austerity measures. On Feb. 27, known as "Black
Monday" in Venezuela, the riots began in Caracas, and spread to Merida and other major cities.
Hundreds of people were killed by soldiers and police officers before the wave of rioting and looting
ended. For the first time in 30 years of civilian power, Perez, during those anarchic moments of
violent popular uprising which became known as the "Caracazo," turned over virtual control of
the country to the armed forces. The Caracazo thus planted the seeds of the abortive coup d'etat.
The economic situation generated a critical mass of social tension, which eventually transformed
economic crisis into social crisis. However, until February 14, the social crisis has been maintained
within the parameters of the existing political system. Perez and mentors; Aristide and critics
Venezuela is very important to the US, not only as a major supplier of oil and a trading partner,
but because it approximates the "model" for what Washington considers the type of democracy it
would like to see in the rest of Latin America: formal democracy, a bipartisan system and 30 years of
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stability. In his second term, Perez has dropped his earlier populism and radical posturing and has
cooperated closely with US policy in the Caribbean Basin. As a result, Venezuela has been favored
by foreign debt reduction (Brady Plan) and other benefits from Bush's Initiative of the Americas.
In an interview with Pensamiento Propio (July 1990), Alfred White, an economic officer at the US
Embassy in Caracas, said, "Naked necessity has something to do with our close relations. You have
to face reality. Let's accept it; this country is governed by an IMF program. And who is behind the
IMF? We are. Perez knows who is buttering his bread." Perez's mentors are also Aristide's critics.
The State Department, although it condemned the coup in Haiti, has claimed on several occasions
that Aristide himself is to blame for his downfall. In brief, Aristide alienated the Haitian elite by
his "radical rhetoric" and subsequent fervor among the impoverished majority to mobilize against
the system of elite privilege. The "democracy" advocated by the US and allied regimes in Latin
America is a tightly controlled political process which aims to keep the military out of government
and sustain representative civilian institutions, while also perpetuating the socio-economic status
quo. Opponents of "low-intensity democracy" argue that participatory democracy is by far the
preferable option for the large majority, and must be an instrument for the construction of a more
equitable distribution of income and wealth. The State Department claim suggests that the US
will promote political democracy as long as it does not go so far as to involve social and economic
democracy. Aristide was overthrown precisely because he attempted to make political democracy
meaningful by pressing for social justice. Lessons from Haiti and Venezuela The circumstances and
the motives for the successful military takeover in Haiti and the abortive coup d'etat in Venezuela
are very different. The Haitian military acted to protect an elite status quo under threat from a
popular, leftist government. The "proximate cause" in the Venezuelan case was not protection of,
but rebellion against, a status quo which is bringing about its own destabilization. The lesson from
Haiti is that democracy in Latin America depends on reforming repressive military organizations
and on preventing military intervention in politics and civil society (see NotiSur 01/08/92). The
lesson from Venezuela is that political democracy in Latin America will not be stable if it does not
also involve social justice, economic democracy, national sovereignty and the democratization of
international relations, including the international economic order.
-- End --
